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1. Introduction 
 
From its inception, the international climate policy effort has predominantly been focused 
on mitigation, i.e. on reducing greenhouse gas emissions to prevent climate change. The 
concept of adapting to climate change has, on the other hand, received less attention. 
This is partly due to the ‗local‘ nature of adaptation, as opposed to the global scope of 
mitigation efforts (Anantram and Noronha 2005: 2). Moreover, the benefits of adaptation 
are not as easily measured – they can‘t be counted as CO2-equivalents, as in the case of 
mitigation (ibid.). There has also been some reluctance towards giving attention to the 
adaptation issue, for fear that it would be seen as a signal of ‗giving up‘ on combating 
climate change.  
At this stage, however, there is little doubt that climate change is happening and 
that it will pose significant challenges in many countries – irrespective of mitigation 
efforts. According to the most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), there is ―high agreement and much evidence that with the current 
climate change mitigation policies (…) global GHG emissions will continue to grow over 
the next few decades‖ (IPCC 2007a: 6). According to the United Nations Human 
Development Report  (UNDP 2007), mitigation will only start to make a difference from 
around 2030 onwards, and even under a best-case scenario, temperatures will continue 
to increase until around 2050 (ibid.: 166). This means that at least until 2050, 
―adaptation is a ‗no-choice‘ option‖ (ibid.). 
 This choice is, however, easier for some than for others. The harm associated with 
climate change – and hence the need to adapt – falls unevenly between countries. The 
poorest countries will be hit the hardest (Hasselknippe 2004; UNDP 2007). Africa, with a 
large majority of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), is one of the most vulnerable 
continents to climate change (IPCC 2007a: 11, 2007b: 13). Also Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) and countries in Asia and Latin America are at special risk (ibid.). These 
are countries with few resources to adapt and with little historic responsibility for the 
climate change problem. As such, they have a strong case when calling for adaptation aid 
from more developed countries. This is also explicitly recognized in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which requires developed 
countries to assist developing countries ―that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse affects‖ 
(UNFCCC 1992: article 4). 
 The funding of adaptation measures in developing countries is the key focus of 
this report. The report has been commissioned by Norwegian Church Aid (Kirkens 
Nødhjelp), with the aim of (i) mapping the estimated needs for adaptation funding in 
developing countries, (ii) presenting the status and ‗delivery‘ of the current financing 
efforts at the multilateral level, and (iii) pointing to some of the possible alternative 
mechanisms that can be implemented in order to generate additional adaptation funding. 
Of course, it should be acknowledged that mere financing represents only a part 
of what is needed in order to adapt to climate change. Effective adaptation measures also 
depend on a series of other factors such as information, institutional capacity, 
technology, transparency and political stability. In this report, however, we cannot go 
into all these issues. We will not discuss what constitutes ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ adaptation 
measures, nor will we discuss the traditional issues of aid effectiveness. Instead, we will 
limit and concentrate our study to the mere issue of generating funding for adaptation, 
presupposing that the funding in any case represents an important prerequisite for 
successful adaptation in the world‘s most climate-vulnerable regions. Though much of the 
funding is still disbursed as official development aid (ODA) at the bilateral level, our focus 
in this report will be on the effort made at the international level – i.e. on the multilateral 
funds established under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
 The report is organised as follows: first we describe the nature and scale of the 
adaptation challenge in developing countries, presenting the range of numbers that have 
been put on the table to estimate the developing countries‘ actual need for adaptation 
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funding. Subsequently, we present the current status of adaptation funding – how much 
money is currently being channelled through the multilateral adaptation funds. We give 
particular attention to the Kyoto Protocol‘s Adaptation Fund, due to the potential size of 
this fund, and due to the political difficulties that have been hampering its functioning 
thus far. Thereafter, the report points to some of the possibilities that lie ahead in terms 
of generating additional adaptation funding. We present the main proposals that have 
been forwarded thus far: increasing the current CDM adaptation levy, or expanding it so 
that it also covers the other flexibility mechanisms such as the Joint Implementation 
mechanism (JI) and Emissions Trading (ET); applying adaptation levies on bunker fuelled 
transports; funding adaptation through carbon taxes; and using revenues from 
auctioning of emission permits. All of these alternatives are presented in brief, the 
purpose being primarily to give the reader a quick overview of some of the possible 
options that exist. The specifics or the feasibility of each proposal are left largely 
unexamined, as such assessments go beyond the scope of this report. Finally, in the last 
chapter we conclude and summarize the report‘s key findings. 
A brief note on the report‘s empirical basis: we draw on a wide range of existing 
work and analyses – the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007a; 2007b), the 
UNFCCC‘s report on investment and financial flows (UNFCCC 2007a), the UNDP Human 
Development Report (UNDP 2007), various World Bank reports (World Bank 2006a; 
2006b), and other relevant studies. To supplement this background of information with 
first-hand data on the subject, a series of interviews have been conducted with actors 
holding in-depth and issue-specific knowledge on the various aspects of international 
adaptation funding (for an overview of the interviewees and their formal positions, see 
the appendix).  
The reader should keep in mind that the subject studied in this report is 
developing rapidly. Multilateral financing of adaptation measures is continuously being 
discussed – both at academic and political levels  – and new ideas and new proposals are 
surely emerging ‗as we speak‘. Thus, it stands to reason that this report can only give a 
‗snap shot‘ of the field – a presentation of its current status and its possible 
developments in the near future. 
 
2. Adapting to climate change 
2.1 The concept of adaptation 
What is adaptation? The IPCC defines it as an ―adjustment in natural or human systems 
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm 
or exploits beneficial opportunities‖ (IPCC 2007c: 6).1 Whereas the principle aim of 
greenhouse gas mitigation activities is to reduce the amount of climate change that is 
likely to be encountered, adaptation activities are intended to reduce the adverse impacts 
that a given amount of warming will cause (Fankhauser 1998: 1). Adaptive responses 
can range from the purely technological ones (such as sea defences and monitoring- and 
early warning systems), through behavioural responses (such as altered food and 
recreational choices), to managerial (e.g. altered farm practises) and to policy responses 
(e.g. planning and building regulations) (IPCC 2007b: 19). In sum, the adaptation term 
covers a wide range of human activities. Their common ‗denominator‘ is protection of 
society from nature, while mitigation efforts  aim to protect nature from society (Stehr 
and von Storch 2005). 
 
Some of the key concepts in the adaptation vocabulary are explained in table 1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The reader should know, however, that there are a large number of other definitions of adaptation as well. For 
an overview and discussion of some of these definitions, see for instance Schipper (2007: 4-6). 
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Table 1. Adaptation: the key concepts. 
 
Climate Change 
Climate change in IPCC usage refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to 
natural variability or as a result of human activity. This is different from the usage in the 
UNFCCC, where climate change refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and 
that is in addition to natural climate variability.  
 
Adaptation 
IPCC defines adaptation as an ―adjustment in natural or human systems in response to 
actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 
beneficial opportunities.‖  
 
Adaptive capacity 
Adaptive capacity is essentially the ability of societies to adjust to climate change on 
their own. In other words, it refers to the ability to moderate potential damages, to take 
advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. 
 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability refers, broadly speaking, to the ability to cope with climate change: the 
higher the ability to cope, the less vulnerable. Poor countries, particularly in Africa, Asia 
and small island states are among the most vulnerable to climate change. This relates 
both to the risk relating to the natural conditions in these countries, and also to their 
general low adaptive capacity. 
 
Sources: (IPCC 2007b: 21; UNDP 2007; McGray, Hammil, and Bradley 2007: 7). 
 
 
2.2 The scale of the adaptation challenge 
The international community has made slow progress in identifying and articulating 
concrete financial adaptation needs in developing countries. This is perhaps not 
surprising, considering that the actual need for adaptation is highly dependent on global 
mitigation efforts. The less we are able to mitigate, the larger the challenge of 
adaptation. However, the scale of the challenge is also difficult to assess irrespective of 
mitigation, because it is so closely connected to other developments such as economic 
growth, population growth and other human developments (UNFCCC 2007a). It will 
depend on non-climate related stresses such as poverty, conflict  and spread of diseases 
as well as on institutional and political factors such as transparency and stability (IPCC 
2007b: 19).  
In spite of these complex and uncertain factors, some initial estimates of the potential 
adaptation costs have been put on the table:  
 
 The World Bank‘s (2006a) estimate concludes that the costs of adapting to 
climate change in developing countries are likely to be between US$ 10-40 billion 
a year (ibid.: 9). This figure is based on the estimated proportion of ODA, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment that is sensitive to climate 
change.  
 Oxfam International (2007), taking into account a broader range of costs, 
estimates the figure to be over US$ 50 billion a year (ibid.:22). 
 Christian Aid goes further and predicts that the annual adaptation costs could be 
double this figure, reaching US$ 100 billion (ibid.: 23).  
 The UNDP‘s Human Development Report (2007) indicates that a total of US$ 86 
billion will be required for adaptation by 2015 (ibid.: 15). 
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 The UNFCCC (2007a) has confined itself to the wide-ranging estimate of US$ 28-
67 billion which will be needed for adaptation in developing countries in 2030 
(ibid.: 8). 
 
The estimates of the cost of adaptation in developing countries are summarized in 
table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Estimated costs of adaptation in developing countries. 
World Bank US$ 10-40 billion (annually) 
UNFCCC US$ 28-67 billion (in 2030) 
UNDP US$ 86 billion (by 2015) 
Oxfam International US$ 50 billion (annually) 
Christian Aid US$ 100 billion (annually) 
 
Sources: The World Bank (2006a: 9), the UNFCCC (2007a: 8), the UNDP (2007: 
15), and Oxfam International (2007: 22-23). 
 
 
As the table clearly shows, the gap between the worst and best case scenario is huge. 
The discrepancy is partly due to varying methods of calculation and varying cost bases 
(UNFCCC 2007a: 97-99). In addition, the variation in estimates also reflects the 
complexity and uncertainty related to the assessment of the exact costs of adaptation. 
No matter which figure one chooses to rely on, however, the message is clear: 
there is a vast need for adaptation funding in developing countries. Developed countries 
have, as mentioned above, made legal commitments under the UNFCCC to help provide 
such funding; developed countries are required to assist developing countries ―that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of 
adaptation to those adverse affects‖ (UNFCCC 1992: article 4). How is the international 
community currently coping with this obligation? What is the status and the ‗delivery‘ of 
the financial mechanisms established under the UNFCCC? 
 
 
3. Financing adaptation – the current picture 
 
The funding available for adaptation in developing countries flows mainly through two 
channels: bilateral, official development assistance (ODA) and multilateral adaptation 
funds. Acknowledging that most of the funding for adaptation still comes from ODA, this 
report will nevertheless concentrate on the multilateral adaptation effort made under the 
UN regime.  
Four adaptation-related funds have been established at the international level. 
Three of them are established under the UNFCCC – the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
Trust Fund‘s Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA),2 the Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). The fourth, the Adaptation Fund 
(AF), has been established under the Kyoto Protocol, meaning that only the countries 
that are party to the Protocol have access to the fund and potential influence on its 
governance. We will present all of the funds in detail in the following sections. 
                                                 
2
 To be precise, the SPA is not a „UNFCCC fund‟ in that it is not subject to direct UN guidance. For reasons of 
simplicity, we will in this report still speak of the SPA as a „Convention fund‟ similar to the LDCF and the 
SCCF, since it was established as a response to an UNFCCC request. 
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3.1 The multilateral adaptation funds 
 
The Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA): The SPA, which became operational in 
July 2004, was created as a response to the UNFCCC request to the GEF to finance pilot 
adaptation projects (Global Environment Facility 2005). Its objective is to ―increase the 
resilience and adaptive capacity of those ecosystems and communities vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change. Projects must focus on reducing vulnerability to 
climate change impacts as their primary objective‖ (UNDP 2008a). The fund is financed 
through a GEF Trust Fund, which has earmarked US$ 50 million over a 3-year period for 
a wide range of pilot projects. The SPA bases its eligibility criteria on the principles of the 
GEF Trust Fund, including the criteria concerning global environmental benefits (Global 
Environment Facility 2005: 1). This means that projects will be eligible under the SPA 
only if their benefits are considered to be global in nature – a characteristic which is 
differs from the other funds under the UNFCCC. To date, US$ 28 million of the earmarked 
funds have been allocated to the SPA. About half of these have been disbursed to 
concrete projects (Global Environment Facility 2007a). Examples of the projects that 
have been approved under the SPA are the ‗Implementation of Pilot Adaptation Measures 
in Caribbean Coastal Areas‘, and ‗Integrating Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate 
Change into Sustainable Development Policy Planning and Implementation in Southern 
and Eastern Africa‘ (for a more detailed project list, see annex 1 of Klein and Möhner 
2008). 
 
The Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF): The LDCF has been in operation under 
the GEF since 2001. Its purpose is to ―support the (a) preparation of National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for identifying urgent and immediate adaptation needs in 
Least Developed Countries; and (b) implementation of NAPAs‖ (UNDP 2008b). The NAPAs 
are essentially national priority lists, describing the projects that are most urgently in 
need of funding. The LDCF relies on voluntary contributions; at the time of this writing, 
eighteen countries3 have pledged contributions to the LDCF (Global Environment Facility 
2007b). The total amount pledged is US$ 163,3 million (ibid.). However, only about 12 
million has actually been allocated and disbursed to implementing agencies (ibid). Thus 
far, the most concrete output from the fund has been the 31 completed NAPAs (UNFCCC 
2008a; see also the UNDP 2007: 188).4  
 
The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF): The SCCF, also administered by the GEF, 
has been operational since 2005. Its purpose is to ―implement long-term adaptation 
measures that increase the resilience of national development sectors to the impacts of 
climate change. Projects must focus on long-term planned response strategies, policies, 
and measures, rather than short-term (reactive) activities‖ (UNDP 2008c). Like the LDCF, 
it relies on contributions from developed countries for funding. So far, thirteen countries5 
have pledged money to the SCCF, totalling US$ 70 million (Global Environment Facility 
2007b). Of this, about US$ 57 million is specifically earmarked for adaptation (UNDP 
2007: 188). About US$ 6 million has thus far been disbursed to implementing agencies 
                                                 
3
 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom have, when writing pledged 
contributions to the LDCF (Global Environment Facility 2007b). 
4
 The countries that, when writing, have completed their NAPAs are: Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinée, Guinea-Bissau, Haïti, Kiribati, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Congo, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sénégal, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, and Zambia (UNFCCC 2008a). 
5
 Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom have, at the time of this writing, pledged contributions to the SCCF 
(Global Environment Facility 2007c). 
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(Global Environment Facility 2007b). Among the projects that have been approved under 
the SCCF are various water governance projects such as the ‗Adaptation to Climate 
Change through effective Water Governance‘ in Ecuador, and the ‗Coping with Drought 
and Climate Change‘ projects in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (for a detailed 
project list, see annex 2 of Klein and Möhner 2008).  
 
Adaptation Fund (AF): The AF was created under the Kyoto Protocol and not the 
UNFCCC. The fund‘s purpose is to ―finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes 
in developing countries that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol‖ (UNFCCC 2008b). What 
really separates the AF from the other funds, however, is its income scheme. In essence, 
the fund is financed through an international private sector tax. More specifically, its 
funds come from a two percent levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
transactions.6 This means that the fund is not contingent upon aid from donors. It also 
means that the scale of the fund will depend on the volume of the CDM market and on 
the price of CDM credits. This of course makes it difficult to estimate the fund‘s potential 
value. The World Bank (2006b) has estimated that about US$ 100–500 million will be 
available from the fund by 2012 (World Bank 2006b: 40). The UNDP (2007) goes further 
and estimates that the fund could reach US$ 950 million by the same year (UNDP 2007: 
189). After this, much depends on the continued functioning of the CDM and the global 
carbon market. Both the World Bank and the UNDP, however, expect the fund to grow 
exponentially after 2012.  
Such a scenario is still a few years ahead, however. The adaptation fund has yet 
to finance any concrete adaptation projects, as its governance structure was not finally 
agreed upon until the end of 2007, a subject to which we shall return in section 3.2 of 
this report.  
  
Table 3 summarizes the current status of the multilateral adaptation funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Under the CDM, parties with a greenhouse gas reduction commitment can invest in projects “abroad”, i.e. in 
non-Annex I countries, as an alternative to what is generally considered more costly emission reductions in their 
own countries. In return for this, the investor is entitled to so-called emission credits, which can then either be 
used to comply with ones own emission targets, or they can be sold with a profit on the emissions trading 
market. 
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Table 3. The multilateral adaptation funds. 
Fund Goal Pledged 
(US$m) 
Received 
(US$m) 
Disbursed 
(US$m) 
 
SPA 
Funds pilot projects 
that address local 
adaptation needs 
and 
generate global 
environmental 
benefits 
 
50 
 
28 
 
14.8 
 
LDCF 
Implementation of 
most urgent 
adaptation 
projects in LDCs, 
based on NAPAs. 
 
163.3 
 
52.1 a 
 
12 
 
SCCF 
Funds activities 
aimed at adaptation 
as well as three 
other purposes: 
technology transfer, 
economic 
diversification, and 
support in key 
sectors. 
 
70 
 
53.3 a 
 
6 
 
AF 
Funds concrete 
adaptation projects 
in developing 
countries that are 
particularly 
vulnerable to 
the adverse effects 
of climate change 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
  Total: 283.3 Total: 133.4 Total: 32.8 
a These numbers are taken from UNDP Human Development report (2007). All other 
figures are according to Global Environment Facility (2007a; 2007b). 
 
 
All in all, the record is as follows: by April 2008, actual multilateral financing delivered by 
the funds set up under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol has reached a total of US$ 
133.4 million – less than half of what has been pledged, and further still from the billions 
that are estimated as needed, even according to the most moderate cost estimates. Of 
course, one should bear in mind that the figures presented here do not represent the 
whole picture. Bilateral ODA is, as mentioned, not taken into account. Nevertheless, it 
has been widely acknowledged that the funding currently delivered for adaptation in 
developing countries is not adequate (UNFCCC 2007a). The estimated needs for funding 
are simply not being met by  supply. 
 However, adaptation in developing countries is not only being hampered by a 
shortage of funding. Concrete action has also been delayed due to institutional difficulties 
in the relations between the recipient countries and the management of the funds7 
(Author‘s interviews. See also Müller 2006b; Tuvalu Government 2007: 8). These 
‗difficulties‘ are well illustrated by the case of the Kyoto Protocol‘s Adaptation Fund, which 
we will take a closer look at in the following section. 
                                                 
7
 It should be noted that varying availability of adaptation projects ready to be implemented „on the ground‟ also 
adds to the factors which have hampered concrete adaptation progress in developing countries (see for instance 
Klein and Möhner 2008). 
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3.2 The history of the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund 
The history of the Adaptation Fund starts in 2001, when the fund was established as part 
of the Marrakech accords8 (UNFCCC 2001). In these accords, it was decided that the AF 
should ―finance concrete adaptation projects‖ in developing countries, that these projects 
were to be financed from a ―share of proceeds on the clean development mechanism 
project activities and other sources of funding‖, and that ―an entity entrusted with the 
operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention‖ should manage and operate the 
fund (ibid.: article 1, 2, 4). Apart from these immediate agreements, however, most of 
the provisions regarding how the fund actually should function and how it should be 
operated, were unfinished business – and would remain so for some years. 
 The fact that the Kyoto Protocol was not yet in force was of course a first obstacle 
hampering the process. Without a functional Protocol, there was in essence no legal 
framework regulating the fund. However, the Protocol coming into force in 2005 would 
not alone get the fund up and running. There would still be governance disagreements 
that needed to be resolved before the fund could become effective. The main point of 
contention was the Washington-based Global Environment Facility (GEF) (see table 4), 
and whether this institution should function as the operator of the fund. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The Global Environment Facility (GEF). 
 
 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an independent financial institution 
established at the Rio Summit in 1992. It grants financial support to projects related 
to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone 
layer, and persistent organic pollutants.  
 
 The GEF serves as the financial mechanism for the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As such, it operates the SPA, the LDCF 
and the SCCF. 
 
 The 32 member GEF Council approves all GEF-governed adaptation projects. The 
Council‘s voting procedure is ‗mixed‘, meaning that it requires a 60 percent majority 
of the total number of participating States, as well as a 60 percent majority of the 
total amount of contributions made to the GEF. In other words, a majority of both 
member countries and donor countries is required to carry a vote – essentially giving 
veto power to the largest donor countries. It should be noted that so far there has 
never been a vote in the GEF Council. 
 
Sources: Global Environment Facility (2008), Müller (2007), and Boisson de Chazournes 
(2006). 
 
The GEF had already been given the responsibility for operating the UNFCCC‘s adaptation 
funds when the debate over the AF started, and thus most developed countries 
considered  it to be only natural that the GEF would be operating the AF as well (Author‘s 
interviews). However, at the first Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Protocol (CMP) in Montreal in 2005, developing countries saw it differently. 
They criticised the GEF, claiming that the procedures for preparing funding requests to 
the GEF were too complicated, that the GEF was dominated by donor interests and that 
developing countries had too little representation in the GEF Council (see Müller 2006a: 
                                                 
8
 The Marrakech Accords is the term of the agreement which settled the rules of the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
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23ff). With the AF revenues being generated in developing countries (through the CDM), 
there was also a strong sense that this was ‗their money‘ and that the AF should 
therefore be governed differently from the other funds. Some pointed to the governance 
structure of such institutions as the Montreal Protocol Fund or the CDM Executive Board 9 
as possible models for the AF (Author‘s interviews. See also Müller 2006b). 
 The debate continued at the UNFCCC‘s Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI) 
meeting in Bonn in May 2006, though without much progress. Both groups held on to 
their positions, seemingly without any intention to back down. The EU, for instance, 
argued that ―we are not using our and the institutions‘ resources efficiently if we request 
information on how to operationalise the adaptation fund from institutions other than the 
GEF‖ (transcript of the EU statement during the May 2006 SBI meeting, as quoted by 
Müller 2006b: 1). Briefly, there was a large amount of distrust between the parties. In 
fact, the atmosphere was sarcastically summarized at the end of the Bonn meeting, when 
Saudi Arabia wished to ―highlight to the plenary, and to our partners, and to everyone 
here, how very, very constructive [all] this has been for building trust between non-
Annex I and Annex I countries‖ (ibid.). 
 The first signs of improvement came during the informal consultations which were 
held as a prelude to the CMP negotiations in Nairobi in 2006. Among these consultations 
was a seminar organised in Oxford by the Fellowship Programme of the European 
Capacity Building Initiative. This seminar brought together a number of leading EU and 
developing country negotiators and helped the parties ―go into listening mode‖ and to 
realize that a continuation of the ―institution-centred [GEF] debate would not be fruitful‖ 
(Müller 2007: 4).  
 On this background, the Nairobi session in 2006 could finally deliver some positive 
results. Two key principles for the governing of the AF were settled: for one, the voting 
procedure was to be different from the procedure in the UNFCCC funds, where the largest 
donor countries essentially have a veto power (see the third point in table 4). In the 
governing of the AF, there would be a one-country-one-vote procedure, essentially giving 
developing countries the majority (UNFCCC 2006: article 3; see also Müller 2007: 5). The 
second key principle settled in Nairobi was that the AF should function ―under the 
authority and guidance‖ of the CMP (UNFCCC 2006: article 1(e), emphasis added). This 
also rendered the AF different from the Convention funds, which are merely subject to 
‗guidance‘ from the Convention, and not to its binding decisions (Müller 2007: 4). In 
other words, the AF would remain under stronger political control than the other funds. 
 The final bits and pieces of the AF puzzle were resolved at the Bali session in 
2007. Once again, key progress was made before the actual session, in informal pre-
sessional consultations. During these consultations, the G77 and China signalled a clear 
willingness to compromise; they still wanted a GEF-independent board with majority 
representation from developing countries. However, they could be flexible on the other 
parts of the governance arrangement; more specifically, ―developed countries could have 
their GEF and their World Bank fill the more subordinate functions‖ – i.e. the secretariat 
and the trustee functions (Author‘s interviews). This compromise proposal was by no 
means easy to swallow – not for developing countries and not for the most eager pro-
GEF countries. On one hand you had parties which didn‘t want the GEF involved at all, 
not even in a ‗subordinate function‘; on the other you had parties which were deeply 
sceptical to the idea of a completely new governing entity. However, knowing that the 
alternative was yet another unresolved session, and yet another year before the fund 
could become operational, it was decided that this was the better deal. It was decided 
that ―this time we‘ll succeed; this time we‘ll actually deliver‖ (ibid.). 
                                                 
9
 The Montreal Protocol Fund is governed by an executive committee which secures equal representation for 
industrialised and non-industrialised countries (seven members each), with equal voting weight for all members 
of the committee. The same principle applies for the CDM Executive Board, which consists of one member from 
each of the five United Nations regional groups, two members from the Annex I-countries, two members from 
non-Annex I countries, and one representative for the small island developing States. Also here, all members 
have equal voting weight. 
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 And so they did. A final agreement on the AF was adopted on 14 December in Bali 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2007). The decision entailed a completely new operating 
entity, i.e. the Adaptation Fund Board. This was to have a majority of its members from 
developing countries, and special seats for each of the two main recipient groups, the 
Group of Least Developed Countries, and the Alliance of Small Island States (UNFCCC 
2007b). The voting procedure for the board was somewhat changed from that which had 
been decided in Nairobi, so that instead of following a one-country-one-vote procedure, 
the board would follow a ‗one member (of the board)-one-vote‘ procedure (ibid.: article 
12). In practice, however, developing countries‘ retained their majority by the 
constituency representation on the board. The change was primarily a call for a more 
efficient solution, where decisions could be made without having to confer with each of 
the Protocol‘s member countries (Author‘s interviews). A consensus was envisaged, and 
if not reached then a two-thirds majority would be necessary to carry the vote.  
The GEF and the World Bank were given the functions as secretariat and trustee, 
respectively. Both were to serve temporarily, however; their roles were to be reviewed 
after three years of function. This interim provision was of major importance to many 
developing countries. It was their ‗safeguard clause‘ without which many never would 
have accepted a GEF secretariat at all (ibid.). 
 Finally, it was decided that all Parties should have direct access to the funds 
(UNFCCC 2007b: article 29). More specifically, any organization or any government could 
apply for funding directly, without having to go through GEF‘s traditional implementing 
agencies such as the World Bank, UNDP, or UNEP. In principle, civil society organizations 
could be eligible for funding provided that they were recognized by the AF board and that 
they meet the board‘s criteria for financial responsibility. Also this was a major victory for 
developing countries, which for long time had criticised the GEF funds for being difficult 
to access. According to the South African Minister who led the final stages of the 
negotiations on behalf of the G77 and China, it had been an aim ―to ensure that this 
Fund will be exempt from the decision-making procedures of the GEF‖, and to give 
developing countries ―a more direct and equitable‖ say in how the funds would be 
prioritised and spent (AllAfrica 2007). 
 All in all, the final outcome on the AF could be regarded as a good one for 
developing countries. They succeeded in establishing a GEF-independent board with 
majority representation of developing countries; they managed to ‗reduce‘ the GEF and 
the World Bank roles to an interim secretariat and an interim trustee; and finally, they 
secured more direct access to the funds. Although it took some time to reach an 
agreement, it seems the political legitimacy of the decision turned out all the better. The 
final solution was one that most countries on both sides of the ‗GEF-divide‘ could live 
with. The ones who initially had feared a completely new governance structure for the 
fund were reassured by the familiarity and the experience of a well-known secretariat 
and trustee. The ones who had feared a blueprint of the governance structure of the 
Convention funds, got something quite new. 
 What happens next? When can the AF actually begin to deliver funding for 
concrete adaptation projects? As it turns out, it might take some time. First of all, the AF 
board, which had its first official meeting in March 2008 (Adaptation Fund Board 2008), 
will have to establish their final rules of procedure before any real projects can be 
approved. Second, the funds generated by the CDM credits purchased so far will have to 
be monetized. Today these funds remain in the form of so-called certified emission 
reductions (CERs, or CDM credits), administered by the World Bank, and they will have to 
be sold on the emissions trading market before any real money can flow into the fund.10 
Thus, the first AF project approvals might not be seen before the end of the year, 
perhaps not before 2009.  
 Already at this stage, however, there are interesting rumours ‗floating around‘ as 
to what the future might hold for the multilateral adaptation funds. Some have suggested 
– so far only informally – that the various funds somehow should be merged (Author‘s 
interviews. See also the Tuvalu Government 2007: 5). More specifically, it has been 
                                                 
10
 Of course, voluntary government contributions can provide additional capital to the fund. 
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predicted that the Convention funds will become redundant now that the AF is up and 
running, and that the funds therefore should be merged into the AF, which by all 
prophecies will become the largest (Author‘s interviews). Some say that the aim should 
be to make the AF the solution for multilateral adaptation financing (ibid.). After all, this 
fund has a great advantage in relation to the other funds in that it generates money 
automatically, without having to rely on politically unstable pledges and contributions. 
The need for adaptation measures in developing countries renders automatic financing 
necessary – because, as one of our informants put it, ―lets not be blue-eyed – nobody 
really wants to give money to adaptation. We won‘t meet the needs on a voluntarily 
basis. Adaption money will have to come from automatic mechanisms, like in the 
Adaptation Fund‖ (ibid.). Some have also pointed to the somewhat overlapping nature 
and mandate of the multilateral funds, and that it might be more effective to compile the 
finances into one streamlined fund (ibid.). However, such ideas have not yet materialised 
into specific, formal proposals. Moreover, they have been met with reluctance from many 
developing countries, who feel that their chances of securing funding are better 
safeguarded by having more than one fund (ibid.). 
Whatever happens, it seems clear that there will be quite some time before the 
multilateral funds start to deliver the billions that have been estimated as the cost for 
adapting to climate change in developing countries. Even with the AF up and running, 
there will probably still be a considerable gap to be covered. It is thus necessary to 
consider additional ways to generate adaptation funding for the countries most 
vulnerable to climate change. This is the object studied in the following chapter of the 
report.  
 
 
4. Financing adaptation – the future picture  
 
A number of proposals on how to generate additional funding have been put on the table. 
Throughout this chapter, we will present some of these proposals in brief. The purpose is 
primarily to give the reader a quick overview of some of the options that exist, even if 
they are in need of further development and exploration. We will not go into the specifics 
of each proposal, nor will we discuss in depth their potential political feasibility. More 
work will have to be done on most of the proposals before such assessments can be 
made. 
 
4.1 Extending the CDM adaptation levy 
One of the proposals that has been forwarded for the purpose of increasing the funding 
for adaptation, is to extend the current CDM adaptation levy. For one, the levy could 
simply be increased in order to quickly boost the financial flows into the Adaptation Fund. 
This has recently been proposed by Pakistan, among others, which suggested an increase 
of the levy from its current two percent level to three to five percent (UNFCCC 2008d: 
15). The CDM levy could also be extended so that it covers the other carbon-trading 
mechanisms such as the Joint Implementation mechanism (JI) and International 
Emissions Trading (IET). Such a broadening of the adaptation levy has been proposed 
several times by developing countries, albeit always with some opposition from 
developed countries. According to estimates by the UNFCCC, this extension could 
generate about US$ 10-50 million a year by 2010 (UNFCCC 2007a: 186).  
The most apparent quality of these proposals lies perhaps in the fact that they 
might actually be feasible, considering that the institutional framework for a CDM levy is 
already in place. Moreover, the proposals expand an automatic instrument for financing 
adaptation, generating more money without having to rely on voluntary pledges and 
contributions. The key challenge for the proposals is no doubt the opposition they have 
spurred from developed countries, which are reluctant to put additional costs on 
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emissions trading. In more general terms, the proposals could be challenged for creating 
financial disadvantages for climate change mitigation. In this regard, Müller (2006a) has 
posed an opportune question: ―Would it not seem more rational to put such a levy on 
emitting greenhouse gases rather than on activities to reduce them?‖ (Müller 2006a: 25, 
emphasis added). This is the line of thinking incorporated in such proposals as putting a 
levy on bunker fuels, using revenue from carbon taxes, or using revenue from auctioning 
of emission permits. These proposals are presented below. 
 
4.2 Adaptation levy on bunker fuels 
Bunker fuel emissions fall roughly into two categories, namely from marine 
transport and from air travel. There are good economic reasons for imposing levies on 
both categories, as  shown by the International Air Travel Adaptation Levy (IATAL) 
proposal (confer Müller and Hepburn 2006), and by the proposal of an International 
Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme (confer IMERS 2008). Both schemes incorporate a 
dual aim: to put a levy on bunker-fuelled transport in order to reduce emissions 
(mitigation), and to raise finances from this levy for developing countries (adaptation). 
According to Müller and Hepburn (2006), an air travel levy could raise a significant 
amount of funding; a modest levy of € 5 per flight ticket would manage to raise € 10 
billion a year (ibid.: 9). A similar proposal has also been put forward by the Tuvalu 
government in their ‗International blueprint on adaptation‘ proposal (Tuvalu Government 
2007). They suggest a 0,01 percent levy on international airfares and maritime transport 
operated by Annex II nationals, and a 0,001 percent levy if the transport is operated by 
Non Annex I nationals (ibid.: 6). At present, no estimates are available on the amount of 
revenue the Tuvalu proposal could generate. 
Besides the obvious advantage of the dual aim of these proposals (mitigation and 
adaptation), they also have the quality of generating funding automatically, like the levy 
on the flexibility mechanisms. Moreover, the proposals have been raised to high level 
discussions both at the CMP in Bali and in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
(see IMERS 2008; Tuvalu Government 2007). Nevertheless, much remains in terms of 
putting in place an international policy framework for the actual implementation of such 
schemes. 
 
4.3 Funding adaptation through carbon taxes 
Carbon taxes of some kind are, unlike the international schemes for a bunker-fuel levy, 
already in use in many countries including Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK. They have also been proposed and hotly debated in other 
countries, including New Zealand, Japan, Australia, Canada, the USA, and as an EU-wide 
measure. Carbon taxes not only spur mitigation, they also generate funding. Instead of 
using the revenues gained for solely national purposes, a percentage of the revenue 
could be used to finance adaptation in developing countries. Such measures may no 
doubt potentially generate substantial funding. On the downside, however, national 
carbon taxes will be sensitive to political changes, and they will thus be more likely to run 
the risk of being terminated in the face of recessions – or elections. The funding 
generated will remain ‘national money‘, meaning that countries perhaps will be more 
likely to use them for domestic purposes rather than sending them ‗overseas‘. 
An internationally governed carbon tax could perhaps avoid such problems. An 
international carbon tax scheme has been proposed by, among others, the Swiss Federal 
Office for the Environment, which during the 2007 Bali negotiations issued a report titled 
―Global Solidarity in Financing Adaptation‖ (UVEK 2007). In this report, the Swiss call for 
a global carbon tax which could generate tens of billions of dollars anually, part of which 
could then ―flow into a global Multilateral Adaptation Fund‖ to help nations cope with 
global warming (ibid.: 6). Also NGOs like Oxfam International and Practical Action have 
spoken out for a global carbon tax in order to generate adaptation funding (Oxfam 2007; 
Practical Action 2007). 
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4.4 Revenues from auctioning in Emission Trading Schemes 
An alternative approach, though with parallels to the carbon tax idea, is to generate 
adaptation funding by means of auctioning emission permits. More specifically, the 
emission permits used and traded in carbon markets can be auctioned and (part of) the 
money raised can be channelled to adaptation purposes. This has recently been proposed 
by, among others, the European Commission (2008). In its climate and energy package 
launched in January this year, the Commission proposed that an increasing part of the 
emission permits distributed under the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) should be 
auctioned, and that part of the revenues from this auctioning should ―go towards helping 
developing countries adapt to climate change‖ (ibid.). The Commission estimates that the 
revenues from such auctioning could amount to € 50 billion a year by 2020 (ibid.). If 
international aviation and shipping were to be included under the Kyoto Protocol, 
auctioning emission permits to these sectors as well could generate an additional US$ 22 
billion a year by 2010, increasing to 35 billion in 2030 according to UNFCCC estimates 
(UNFCCC 2007a: 204). 
A similar proposal has been made by the Norwegian Minister of Finance, Kristin 
Halvorsen, at the Bali CMP session in 2007. She suggested an approach where a small 
portion of the national emission quotas could be withheld at the international level, to 
subsequently be auctioned by an ―appropriate international institution‖ (UNFCCC 2008c: 
50-51). The resulting revenues could then be placed into ―a fund to be used on 
adaptation actions or other specified purposes such as technology development‖ (ibid.). 
It was predicted that ―even a small percentage of auctioning would generate a large 
source of finance‖ (ibid. See also Norwegian Government 2007). 
 These proposals have the same inherent qualities as the carbon tax proposals. 
Moreover, they are being seriously discussed at high political level, though not yet 
implemented. Of course, they are dependent on continued functioning of the carbon 
market and emissions trading post-2012, when the Kyoto Protocol‘s first trading period 
expires. However, an international scheme for such redistribution could potentially 
produce a stable source of financing for adaptation. The same goes for a national 
scheme, though such an approach would carry with it the same risk as the national 
carbon taxes, i.e. that the funding generated would be likely to be regarded as ‘national 
money‘ rather than money for adaptation in developing countries. 
 
4.5 Summary of the proposals 
The above mentioned proposals are among those most frequently put on the table when 
discussing the issue of how to generate additional funding for climate change adaptation 
in developing countries. They are summarized in brief in table 5.  
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Table 5. Proposals to strengthen the financing of adaptation. 
Proposal Features 
 
Extending the CDM adaptation levy 
 
 
Increasing the CDM levy, and/or broadening it 
so that it also covers JI and IET. 
 
 
Adaptation levy on bunker fuels 
 
 
Put adaptation levy on the use of bunker fuels, 
i.e. on maritime and airborne transport.  
 
 
Funding adaptation by carbon taxes 
 
 
Using revenues from national carbon taxes for 
adaptation funding. 
 
 
Using revenues from auctioning of 
emission permits 
 
 
Using revenues from the auctioning of emission 
permits in emission trading schemes to fund 
adaptation. 
 
 
As mentioned, most of these proposals are in need of further development – both in 
terms of technical, economic and political issues – before any detailed assessments of 
their potential feasibility can be made. The reader can find some details, however, by 
consulting Srinivasan (2006), Practical Action (2007), Oxfam (2007), and Müller (2006a), 
among others. 
There are of course other proposals regarding financing of adaptation measures, 
besides the ones listed in table 5. For instance, proposals regarding the possible 
redirecting of fossil fuel subsidies are often put forward, not least from various NGOs. 
These subsidies constitute no small amount: the World Bank has estimated the world 
fossil fuel subsidies to be more than US$ 230 billion (Global Subsidies Initiative 2008). If 
such support was ended, some of the revenue raised could be redirected and channelled 
towards financing adaptation in developing countries. Not only could such a change entail 
substantial amounts of money for adaptation purposes, it would also have a positive 
mitigation effect, in that fossil fuel production would decrease. Among the NGOs that 
have advocated putting an end to fossil fuel subsidies, is the new economics foundation 
(new economics foundation 2004: 6). Whether such a scenario is plausible in the short 
time perspective required by the adaptation challenge, we will leave for others to discuss. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
In this report, we have (i) mapped the estimated needs for adaptation funding in 
developing countries, (ii) presented the status and ‗delivery‘ of the current financing 
efforts at the multilateral level, and (iii) pointed to some of the possible alternative 
mechanisms that can be implemented in order to generate additional funding. 
 As we have seen, climate change will, irrespective of our mitigation efforts, 
demand adaptation in most parts of the world. However, the greatest challenge will be 
for developing countries. These are countries with little historic responsibility for the 
climate change problem – and with generally fewer resources to adapt. Yet, the 
resources needed are significant, ranging from US$ 10-100 billion a year. Of course, such 
wide-ranging numbers are hampered by numerous uncertainties and complexities, as it is 
difficult to assess the exact cost of adaptation. No matter which figure one chooses to 
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rely on, the picture is clear: the need for funding for adaptation measures in developing 
countries is significant. 
 Developed countries have made legal commitments under the UNFCCC to help 
provide such funding; they are required to assist developing countries ―that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of 
adaptation to those adverse affects‖ (UNFCCC 1992: article 4). Thus, four multilateral 
adaptation funds have been established at the international level: (i) the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund‘s Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA), which 
finances pilot adaptation projects if their benefits are considered to be global in nature, 
and which is not subject to direct guidance from the UNFCCC (unlike the others); (ii) the 
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), which aims to help identify the urgent and 
immediate adaptation needs in Least Developed Countries and to implement their 
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs); (iii) the Special Climate Change 
Fund (SCCF), focuses on implementing long-term adaptation measures and pro-active 
strategies rather than short-term (reactive) activities ; and finally, (iv) the Adaptation 
Fund (AF), whose purpose it is to finance concrete adaptation projects in developing 
countries that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The AF is financed through a two percent 
levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) transactions, whereas the three other 
funds are all dependent on voluntary pledges. 
So far, the output of these funds is as follows: by April 2008, actual multilateral 
financing delivered by the funds set up under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol has 
reached a total of US$ 133.4 millions – only half the amount that has been pledged (US$ 
283.3), and far short of the estimated needs. Of course, these figures do not cover the 
whole picture. Bilateral ODA has, as previously pointed out, not been taken into account 
in this report. Moreover, there is varying availability of adaptation projects ready to be 
implemented ‗on the ground‘.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that the funding currently 
delivered is not adequate. Even with the AF up and running, a fund which has been 
predicted to reach between US$ 100-500 million in 2012 by the World Bank – US$ 950 
million by the UNDP – much still remains before the multilateral funds can start to deliver 
the billions that have been estimated as necessary to meet the adaptation costs in 
developing countries. 
Concrete adaptation progress has also been hampered by institutional and political 
difficulties  between recipient countries and the management of the funds. The 
operationalizing process of the Adaptation Fund described in this report demonstrates a 
strongly felt mistrust amongst many developing countries against the GEF and its 
implementing agencies, resulting in years of delay in the operationalization of the AF 
and, ultimately, in the creation of a completely new governing entity for the fund. The 
process has been a contentious and time-consuming one, but it may have been 
necessary in order to secure a more politically legitimate governance structure for the 
fund. It remains to be seen what the concrete results of the new governance structure 
will be, as the AF board has just started setting up its rules of procedure and has not yet 
funded any concrete adaptation projects. Its future performance will surely be 
interesting, however. Even more so considering the informal suggestions that have been 
made regarding a possible ‗merging‘ of the other funds into the AF. 
Whatever the development of the multilateral adaptation funds, the gap between 
their projected ‗supply‘ and the estimated needs, has made it necessary to consider new 
and additional ways to generate adaptation funding. This report has presented some of 
the most important proposals that have been put on the table so far: increasing and/or 
extending the CDM adaptation levy so that it also covers the JI and the ET; applying 
adaptation levies on bunker-fuelled transport; funding adaptation through carbon taxes 
and using revenues from auctioning of emission permits. The purpose of this report has 
primarily been to give the reader a quick overview of the various options. Due to the 
scope of this report, and since the details of the proposals to a large degree still remain 
unfinished business, a more detailed assessment of the proposals is left for others to 
pursue. What is clear is that there is no shortage of potential sources of additional 
adaptation funding. Which of these sources may actually materialize into concrete and 
well-functioning funding schemes remains to be seen. 
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6. Appendix: The interviewees 
 
 
Mr. Benito Müller: 
Director (Energy & Environment) at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Expert on 
multilateral climate change and adaptation negotiations. Interviewed by phone from 
Oslo, 20 February 2008. 
 
Mr. Hans Olav Ibrekk: 
Newly elected member (alternate) of the Adaptation Fund‘s Board. Also project manager 
of the Environmental Action Plan at the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(Norad). Interviewed in Oslo, 13 February 2008. 
 
Mr. Erik Bjørnebye: 
Ambassador/Special Adviser on Environment, at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Interviewed in Oslo, 6 February 2008. 
 
 
Mrs. Martina Klenner: 
European Commission, DG Environment. Climate Change Strategy unit. International 
negotiation and monitoring of EU Action. Interviewed in Brussels, 28 February 2008. 
 
Mrs. Maria Lamin: 
European Commission, DG Development. Environment and Rural Development unit. 
Interviewed in Brussels, 16 October 2007. 
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